The Impact of the European Union Trade Policies on the Guyanese Sugar Industry

The Impact of the European Union Trade Policies on the Guyanese Sugar Industry

Submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for

Agriculture Economics II – ECN 413

For the

Bachelor’s Degree in Economics Programme

Of

The University of Guyana, Turkeyen Campus

Faculty of Social Sciences

Submitted To:

Ms Dianna DaSilva

By

05/0833/1056

Number of Words: 3124

2009-03-13

Table of Contents

Page

Introduction                                                                                                                                                       1

Objectives and Justification                                                                                                                         2

The Historical Development of European Union Sugar Policies                                                   3

The Structure and Conduct of European Union Sugar Policies 1970-2008                            8

The Impact of European Union Sugar Policies on Guyana 1980-2008                                      11

Conclusion                                                                                                                                                           14

Bibliography                                                                                                                                                        15

List of Figures:

Fig 1 – Major Sugar Exporters and Importers 1998/1999                                                               5

Fig 2 – Organization of the Common Agricultural Policy                                                                 6

Fig 3 – EU Sugar Exports and Imports 1995-2003                                                                              9

Fig 4 – Guyanese Sugar Exports -1980 to 2007 (Current Market Prices)                                 12

Introduction

“I pity them greatly… but I must be mum, for how could we do without sugar and rum?”[1]

The exact nature of the colonial relationship that existed between  Europe and the Caribbean was, to a large extent defined by hardship, poverty, and prosperity; unequally shared between the former and the latter but none the less the hallmark of a political, social and economic order that was to last for over four hundred years.

Sugar was, and to a certain (diminished) extent still is, synonymous with the European domination of the region. If slavery was the means to an end, then the production of sugar was certainly the ends that sought to justify those singularly brutal means. Sugar however, survived the changing political, moral, religious and economic upheavals that contributed to the end of slavery and indeed it prospered and persisted through many of the other upheavals that were to shape the Caribbean’s eventual relationship with Europe.

By the turn of the twentieth century sugar had established itself as more than just a commodity in the Caribbean. It was one of the mechanisms by which an enormous transfer of wealth was made to Europe under the guise of a “paternal” and “symbiotic” colonial system. So important was sugar to the Europeans that the sugar industries even survived the independence movements that threw off the yolk of colonialism in the 1960’s. By that time a system of preferential trade had already developed and though nominally at least, the proceeds of sugar production began to enrich the people of the Caribbean this system ensured that the terms of trade were still immensely favourable to Europe.

Objectives and Justification

The Guyanese sugar industry, as presently constituted, faces tremendous internal and external challenges in the near to mid term. The extent to which the industry is able to successfully navigate these challenges will determine in large part if it will, in the long term still be a viable going concern.

This paper seeks to analyse the impact of the EU’s Agricultural policies on Guyana’s sugar industry, and in particular, ascertain if these policies have in the long run been a hindrance or helpful to the development of the sugar sector in Guyana.

The Historical Development of the European Union Sugar Policies

During the same decade in which the first Caribbean territories achieved independence, Europe began to move towards a shared destiny in the form of a common economic, monetary and social union. The catalyst for this diametrically opposite thrust was World War II. The devastation and destruction that was wrought upon Europe persuaded the powers that be that mutual prosperity and security lay along the path of an ever deepening integration movement.

One of the most prominent symbols of this integration and one of the first instruments to codify the European cooperation was the Common Agricultural Policy. The CAP has been the primary instrument through which Europe has exercised the control of agriculture policy in general, and, until its reformation the overarching framework under which sugar policy in particular was administered.

The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) was set up by the original members of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957 with the following objectives[2]:

1. To increase productivity, by promoting technical progress and ensuring the optimum use of factors of production, in particular labour
2. To ensure a fair standard of living for the Agricultural Community
3. To stabilize markets
4. To secure the availability of supplies
5. To provide consumers with food at reasonable prices

Within the Common Agricultural Policy, the primary structural mechanism that has governed the European Union’s treatment of its domestic sugar industry and managed the flow of foreign sugar imports is the Common Market Organization (CMO) for sugar.

The CMO was set up in 1968 and its initial strategic aims, in line with the overall aims of the CAP were to[3]:

1. Ensure a fair income to EEC sugar producers
2. Ensure self supply within the EEC market.

To achieve these limited aims steep import tariffs were instituted to protect the domestic European market from foreign competition and strict production quotas were set for domestic producers. A levy on production covered the cost of exporting any surplus production, and in this way the initial scheme mostly paid for itself and required little if any budgetary support from the EEC[4].

Britain joined the EEC proper in 1971, and assented to the CAP (and thus the CMO) in 1975. The CMO was then adjusted to incorporate Britain’s prior commitment to ACP countries to import raw cane sugar for refining and sale in the UK markets[5] . The ACP /EU sugar protocol (known as the Lome Convention) which was signed in 1975 dramatically changed the thrust of the CMO and the nature of Europe’s relationship with Caribbean sugar.

1. The ACP / EU sugar protocol mandated duty free access to the European market for raw sugar at preferential prices.
2. The ACP/EU sugar protocol increased the supply of raw sugar to the European market and facilitated the EEC (and later the EU) becoming the one of the largest exporters of sugar in the world[6].

Fig 1 – Major Sugar Exporters and Importers 1998/1999

From 1975 until 2000 all trade access to the EU by the ACP countries was governed by the Lome Convention.[7] The Lome convention guaranteed the ACP countries duty free access to European markets for selected exports such as sugar.

This convention was successfully renegotiated up until 2000, when a successor agreement, the Cotonou agreement was agreed to as a comprehensive framework to address the political, economic, social and cultural development of the relationship between the EU and the ACP countries. The Cotonou agreement preserved many of the preferential trade conditions that had existed within the previous Lome agreement especially within the realm of duty free access for sugar to the European market under a quota system.

The Cotonou agreement was, among other things, meant bring the relationship between Europe and the ACP countries into compliance with World Trade Organization standards, but the negotiations between the ACP / Cariforum countries and the EU resulted in an agreement that did not meet the standards set by the WTO with regards to free trade and access to markets. Because both the EU and ACP member countries were also members of the WTO, they were placed in a unique situation of having to obtain a waiver from the WTO to implement the terms and conditions of the Cotonou agreement that they had negotiated amongst themselves.

Fig 2 – Organization of the Common Agricultural Policy

Because the Cotonou agreement was a unilateral concession that, in effect unfairly prejudiced the entry of goods from other countries its continued existence was untenable within the WTO framework. The waiver system that facilitated its existence expired in 2007, and with strong resistance to its renewal coming from non-ACP members of the WTO a successor agreement that was WTO compliant, had to be negotiated with ACP /Cariforum countries. This agreement was significantly less generous to the ACP in general, and the Caribbean in particular, as it has in effect, removed most of the preferential terms of trade that made Caribbean sugar a viable export commodity to Europe.

As of October 2008 the trade relationship between Cariforum countries and the EU are now governed by an Economic Partnership Agreement. This agreement has superseded the Cotonou Agreement which was unilaterally renounced by the EU.

The Structure and Conduct of EU Sugar Policies 1970-2008

From the inception of its organization the Common Market Organization (CMO) of sugar was premised on the following structure:

Internal (Domestic EU) Market – The internal market was organized as a monopsony and had the following features that regulated the prices that farmers received for the production of sugar:

1. Intervention prices – The CMO set a minimum price below which sugar could not be bought. Since 1993 intervening agencies have had a minimum price of €631.90 and €523.70 per ton of white and raw sugar respectively[8].
2. Derived Prices –These are yearly prices “derived” from the intervention prices and set for white sugar in the Community’s sugar deficit areas.
3. Interprofessional Agreements – These agreements incorporate a framework of provisions detailing the contractual relationship between beet growers and sugar manufacturers setting minimum standards for sugar and beet quality, terms of purchase for production and rules on quota transfers between enterprises. These rules are analogous to standards and quality assurance regulations that can be used as a form of non-tariff barriers.
4. National Aid – Article 46 of the CMO basic regulations also authorized states to provide aid to their sugar producers, up to a certain level if the situation warranted it.

In addition to these price support measures the CMO also mandated internal quotas. For production up to but not exceeding these quotas the CMO guaranteed that community prices would be paid. Production over the allotted quota is not supported by the CMO and such production cannot be easily sold within the community. This production is either “carried over” to the next year or sold on the world market. The quota system was derived and distributed as follows:

1. A basic or A quota, derived by splitting EU consumption amongst the community on the basis of their previous production capacity.
2. An extended or B quota set at between 30% to 45% of the A quota according to market disposal potential of the current year.
3. Post 1973 a C quota was established which covered production over the allotted quota amounts. This quota was sold on the world market at world market prices, with no price support offered by the CMO.

The CMO also supported the Sugar sector by implementing a system of export refunds. Export refunds were introduced to subsidize the cost of exporting A and B quota sugar that had not been used for domestic consumption. This subsidy covered the difference between the world price and the community price. These refunds applied to beet sugar produced within the EU and cane sugar imported from the ACP. This practice fueled a rapid growth in EU sugar exports, and by 1998/99 the EU was the second largest exporter of sugar after Brazil.

Fig 3 – EU Sugar Exports and Imports 1995-2003

The CMO also had specific policy measures for sugar imported from the ACP and other preferential markets. The CMO absorbed agreements that were formerly between the UK and the ACP countries and incorporated them within the Lome convention in 1975. Specifically these agreements committed the EEC (and later the EU) to purchase a certain quantity of sugar from the ACP and conversely, mandated the ACP countries to supply the requisite quantities of sugar annually. Additionally these exports to Europe were duty free and the final price could be negotiated between buyers and sellers but with a minimum price guaranteed by the EEC.

Both the internal structure of the CMO and its external commitments with regards to the ACP countries had to be drastically changed with the advent of the World Trade Organization (in 1995) and the push for free trade.

The internal EU market, with its plethora of subsidies and payment support options had to be reformed after a series of successful WTO challenges mounted by non EU /ACP countries such as Brazil and Thailand. Reform of the CMO started in 2006 and resulted in cuts in the internal price paid for sugar, a merger of the existing types of quotas and incentives to reduce production in less efficient areas[9]. These reforms have resulted in a significant reduction of the internal capacity for sugar production.

Externally the EU has renounced the Cotonou and forged ahead with Economic Partnership Agreements with areas/trading blocs with which it had previously shared preferential trading agreements. Like the internal reforms undertaken in 2006, the EPA’s significantly cut the price paid for sugar but still preserve quota free access.

The Impact of EU Sugar Policies on Guyana 1980 -2008

In the immediate aftermath of first Lome convention, the Caribbean in general, and Guyana in particular found itself locked into a preferential market where, initially at least, the price for sugar was below the world market price. This situation quickly reversed itself however and by 1980, the guaranteed prices and preferential market access granted to the ACP member countries were prized assets that were central to the economic well being of a significant number of these states. To that end the EU/ACP sugar protocol provided many positive benefits for Guyana:

1. Guaranteed Market Access –The guarantee of a specified, quota free access to the lucrative European market was a powerful positive incentive to sugar production in Guyana. The guaranteed prices reduced the uncertainty cause by the fluctuations in the price of sugar on the world market and provided a stable platform on which future production plans could be made.
2. High Prices – The price received for sugar under the terms of the Lome and subsequent Cotonou protocols were significantly higher than the world price for sugar over most of the corresponding time period. These high prices made up for the fact the Caribbean producers of sugar cane were generally at the high end of the scale when it came to per unit production costs. Because of these high prices, the sugar industry in the Guyana (and the Caribbean) was still able to be profitable and thus remained a source of employment for the significant number of persons that it employed in each respective country.

Fig 4 – Guyanese Sugar Exports -1980 to 2007 (Current Market Prices)

1. Stable Source of Foreign Exchange- The preferential market, and the revenue garnered from the sale of sugar in it, was, especially for Guyana, a stable source of significant foreign exchange. This was especially important given the fact that up until 1989 Guyana’s exchange rate was fixed. As with all fixed exchange rates, the maintenance of a particular exchange rate level would require an accompanying level of foreign reserves. The export of sugar to the EU and the resultant sugar levy on the proceeds of this sale was one of the primary methods that the Guyana government employed to fulfill the foreign reserve requirement need to successfully defend the fixed exchange rate in effect over the period.

The Sugar Protocol did however have serious long term drawbacks that ultimately, have left the entire Caribbean region at a particular disadvantage when it came to sugar production:

1. The high prices and guaranteed access to the European market acted as a subsidy to the region’s sugar producers and masked their underlying inefficiency and uncompetitive structure. In the long run productivity was not improved and inefficient producers did not exit the sector because, once they kept their costs low enough to be profitable with the  preferential markets intact, there were no incentives to transfer resources out of the sector and into other industries where it would be better utilized.
2. Preferential prices distorted market signals on price and quantity requirements. Over the period 1975 – 1993 the size of the ACP quota for duty free access to the European market changed very little . This meant that there was little incentive for changes in the productive capacity of these countries. Indeed most countries (especially the higher cost producers) concentrated on supplying their preferential markets and local markets because any additional production would be loss making at world market prices. The net result of this was that industry, especially in Guyana never pursued an expansionary policy to take advantage of falling Long Run Average Costs (Economies of Scale), with a view to reaching levels of efficiency and productivity that would be competitive on the world market. Today, with the preferential protocols abrogated, many of the high producers in the Caribbean have had to exit the sector because they have been unable to cover costs with the lower prices that now obtain in the European market.
3. The structure of the preferential agreements indirectly dissuaded the move into value added products by countries such as Guyana. In the case of sugar they offered no incentives to produce refined or packet sugars. For over four decades therefore the sugar industry in Guyana has produced the same product and has not, until very recently, sought to diversify its productive base within sugar in a meaningful manner. Implicitly as well, unchanging production has meant unchanging production methods resulting obsolete technology currently being employed in an industry that is based on competitiveness and efficiency on the world scale.

Conclusion

In many quarters the preferential trade policies proffered by the EU to ACP member countries after 1975 are seen to be of benefit to the region in general, and Guyana in particular. Undoubtedly during the course of their implementation, Guyana did benefit directly; the access to preferential markets allowed the country to maintain the sugar industry at a size that would have been uneconomic otherwise. This had positive short term benefits for employment levels in the industry and foreign exchange collection for the country.

In the long run however these subsidies encouraged inefficiency and altered market signals with the result that the industry failed to modernize and improve productivity whilst also encouraging inefficient producers to stay within the sector. Across the Cariforum countries this resulted in an industry that was unable to adjust when these preferential agreements were abrogated in 2007. The net result was a disorderly displacement of resources from these now uncompetitive industries in territories such as St Kitts, Trinidad, Barbados and Jamaica with the lowest cost producer in the region Guyana, engaging in a desperate attempt to modernize its industry to stay competitive on the global market.

Bibliography

1. Gudoshnikov, Sergey, Lindsay Jolly and Donald Spence, The World Sugar Market, Woodhead Publishing,Cambridge,2004
2. Fennel, Rosemary, The Common agricultural Policy: Continuity and Change, Oxford University Press, Oxford,1997
3. European Commission Directorate General, A Description of the Common Market Organization in Sugar , http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/markets/sugar/reports/descri_en.pdf
4. Schmitz, Troy G, Seale, James L and Buzzanell, Peter J, Brazil’s Domination of the World Sugar Market, http://agb.poly.asu.edu/workingpapers/msabr0207_brazilsugar.pdf
5. Caricom Regional Negotiating Machinery, Getting to Know the EPA, http://www.crnm.org/documents/updates_2007/special_rnmupdate_on_epa.htm
6. Bureau,JeanChristophe,Gohin, Alexandre, Guinde, Luic and Millet, Guy Global Sugar Markets, Policies and Reform Options http://www.ifpri.org/events/conferences/2007/20070601sugar/Bureau_etal.pdf
7. Cowper, William, Pity for Poor Africans (1800) : http://www.poemhunter.com/quotations/sugar/
8. Wikipedia, Common Agricultural Policy, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Agricultural_Policy

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[1] Cowper, William – Pity for Poor Africans (1800) : http://www.poemhunter.com/quotations/sugar/

[2] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Agricultural_Policy

[3] A Description of the Common Market Organization in Sugar – http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/markets/sugar/reports/descri_en.pdf – pg 5

[4] A Description of the Common Market Organization in Sugar – http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/markets/sugar/reports/descri_en.pdf – pg 5

[5] A Description of the Common Market Organization in Sugar – http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/markets/sugar/reports/descri_en.pdf – pg 5

[6] Brazil’s Domination of the World Sugar Market -http://agb.poly.asu.edu/workingpapers/msabr0207_brazilsugar.pdf pg 3

[7] http://www.crnm.org/documents/updates_2007/special_rnmupdate_on_epa.htm

[8] A Description of the Common Market Organization in Sugar – http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/markets/sugar/reports/descri_en.pdf -pg 6

[9] Global Sugar Markets, Policies and Reform Options – http://www.ifpri.org/events/conferences/2007/20070601sugar/Bureau_etal.pdf -pg 3

Changes in the Guyanese Economy and the implications for skills

CHANGES TAKING PLACE IN THE GUYANESE ECONOMY AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR SKILLS

Introduction

The Guyanese economy has undergone significant changes in the last thirty years, partly in response to external changes originating from the world economy, and partly as a result of changes initiated locally in pursuit of development goals.

The Guyanese economy, in absolute and relative terms, is a significantly different proposition in 2009 than it was in 1979. This paper seeks to quantify the depth and scope of these differences, and to assess the implications of these changes on the skill sets needed by labour in order to participate effectively in the current labour market. In doing so the following key areas will be examined:

1. Structural Changes
2. Changes in the Labour Force  Participation Rates

Structural Changes

1. Public Sector Employment – In 1979 Guyana’s development goals, and consequently government economic policy, revolved around socialism, and control of the “commanding heights of the economy”. At that time a large public sector, and government control of industry was seen as a prerequisite to achieving the development goals associated with socialism.

By 1989 socialism was repudiated as political policy, and a large public sector, involved in many disparate economic and socio-economic endeavors also fell out of favour. Capitalism and free market policies became the ascendant economic and political policy. Between 1989 and 1992 a significant number of public sector corporations (many of them monopolistic in nature) were divested as part of a concerted effort to shrink the public sector.[1]

The government obviated its participation in many key industrial sectors e.g. transport (air and land), banking, mining and manufacturing.[2] Consequently, public sector declined dramatically, from approximately 98,000 in 1980, to less than 28,000 in 1997.

Implications for Skills

The shrinkage in the public sector has had adverse effects on the availability of jobs in this sector. Traditionally in Guyana, the government was always regarded as a “guarantor of employment” or an “employer of last resort”. The public sector in particular was viewed as an option that not only provided job security and a path into the middle class, but an opportunity for persons who possessed only general training (school leaving certificates etc) to access specific and specialized training for free or at a massively subsidized cost. This contraction in public sector jobs has, ceteris paribus, forced both new entrants and established members of the workforce to compete more intensively for jobs in the private sector.

The very nature of some of the public sector entities necessitated the provision of intensive job specific training which was for the most part either free or highly subsidized. To this end apprentice schemes, post secondary training schools and job specific training institutions existed on a relatively larger scale during the period when the government maintained a large public sector (1979-1989). During this period, even university education was provided for free.

Post 1992, the contraction in the public service has adversely affected the requirement for new specific training in the public sector and thus the government’s commitment to provide same. This is evidenced by the closure of

1. Composition of the Gross Domestic Product –The Bank of Guyana breaks down the Gross Domestic Product into five (5) distinct aggregate components:

1. Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing
2. Mining and Quarrying
3. Manufacturing
4. Construction
5. Services

A review of the performance of each of these components shows that some areas have expanded whilst some have contracted over time. Structurally, the Guyanese economy remains underpinned by the Agriculture and Services sector. The Services sector (which includes, and in recent years, has been dominated by Government Services) alone accounts for on average 40% of the GDP of the country, with Agriculture accounting for approximately 30%.

SECTOR OUTPUT AS A PERCENTAGE OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (AT FACTOR COST)

Year	Agriculture	Mining	Manufacturing	Construction	Services	Total
1979	26.55%	14.33%	8.23%	7.21%	43.68%	100
1984	28.37%	4.61%	9.22%	7.09%	50.71%	100
1990	23.62%	9.46%	11.15%	7.41%	48.36%	100
1994	29.26%	12.02%	11.98%	7.15%	39.60%	100
1999	30.78%	10.89%	12.05%	7.81%	38.46%	100
2004	29.23%	9.27%	11.69%	8.72%	41.10%	100
2007	30.14%	6.74%	6.05%	10.40%	46.64%	100

Over the period under review it must be noted that:

1. There has been a small but significant increase in the measured construction component of GDP. This may be attributed to the general increase in activity in the housing sector that has occurred since the mid 1990’s.

1. The contribution of manufacturing to the national economy has been declining steadily since 1999 and as of 2007, it is below 1979 levels when measured as a percentage of GDP. This reduction in the contribution of manufacturing to GDP may be symtomatic of a sector in terminal decline. The hig cost and irregular availability of key inputs (e.g.electricity) and the lack of ready access to global markets indicate the severe challenges  that this sector faces in trying to ensure its long term viabiality.

1. The contribution of mining to GDP has declined after 1994. This reflects the decreasing contribution of Omai gold mines to gold production and also the continued inability of the bauxite sector to establish viability after it was nationalised in 1971[3].

Implications for Skills

Over the period under review it can be seen that broadly speaking there has been a contraction in the mining and manufacturing sectors contribution to GDP, with an increasing contribution coming from the construction sector.

As a signal to the market this may indicate that skills in the declining sectors may, ceteris paribus, be less in demand in the present economic circumstances. Additionally these declining sectors may also be a source of current and future structural unemployment.

Additionally to the degree to which there is substitutability between jobs in different sectors there may be some movement job movement from declining sectors to expanding sectors.

Changes in the Labour Force and Labour Force Participation Rates

Over the period under review the Guyana Labour Force has changed both in its size and composition. The size of the labour force has increased, in absolute terms from its 1970 levels but it has declined from its absolute largest size in 1992.

The overall labour force participation rate has also increased from 49% in 1970 to 56.1% in 2002 though it has declined from its absolute high of 59.5% in 1992[4]. This increase in the labour force participation rate has mirrored the overall increase in the labour force.

The changing trends in labour force participation in Guyana become more evident when the LFPR is analyzed by gender. Since 1977 the LFPR for men has declined overall, whilst it has increased for women, though it is off its absolute high attained in 1992.

Implications for Skills

The decline in the male LFPR and the increase in the female LFPR indicate a shift in employment patterns, as more females enter the labour force. This decline in the male LFPR may also reflect changing attitudes to education and employment and retirement, as men enter the labour force later and leave earlier.

The female LFPR may reflect increases due to changing attitudes towards work within the adult female population, as well as the increasing relative attractiveness of work to women due to rising real wages.

Looking forward this may mean that a greater portion of the workforce may be provided by women. A study on the effects of increased female LFPR in Ghana[5] indicates that the degree to which educational opportunities are provided to women offers a very strong correlation to both degree of participation and the final income level achieved by women especially in rural areas.

Implicitly therefore the conclusion may be drawn that specific efforts should be made to provide greater educational and training opportunities to women (especially in rural areas) in order to preserve ad accelerate the gains made in increasing the female LFPR.

Conclusion

The Guyanese economy has undergone significant changes and this is reflected in its present structural composition and the composition of its labour force. The labour force in particular has undergone and continues to undergo significant structural and demographic change.

The implication of this is that the types and quantity of skills required to power the economy will therefore have to adapt to these changing circumstances. Failure to do so may result in systemic and persistent mismatches between the skills available in the job pool and the skills required to run the economy (structural unemployment).

In the long run however, the Guyanese economy is expected to benefit from the changes that it has, and continues to undergo and emerge as a competitive and vibrant force in the region.

Annex A

Guyanese Public Corporations Divested: 1989 – 1992 (Partial List)
1	Guyana Timbers Limited
2	Guyana Telecommunications Ltd
3	Guyana Nichmo Ltd
4	Guyana National Trade Corporation Limited
5	Guyana Leather Craft Limited
6	Livestock Development Company Limited (partially)
7	National Paint Company
8	Demerara Woods Limited
9	Guyana Transport Services Limited
10	Quality Foods (Guyana) Limited
11	Sijan Place Restaurant
12	Guyana Fisheries Limited
13	Guyana Rice Milling & Marketing Authority
14	Soap and Detergents Limited
15	Guyana Airways limited
16	Linden Mining Company

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[1] http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/ppprivassessment[1].pdf

[2] See Annex A

[3] http://www.guyana.org/features/postindependence/chapter3.html

[4] http://www.psc.org.gy/press/bulletins/tib_04%20-%20Labour%20Force%20and%20Employm.pdf

[5][5] Female Labour Force Participation – The Effects of Education http://www.aercafrica.org/documents/RP150.pdf